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ABSTRACT Despite the fact that the experiential perspective has had a profound impact on the way 
we view leisure behaviour, experiential matters have been renounced for being overtly subjective. As 
a corollary, experiential matters have been castigated for their inability to offer concrete criteria for 
leisure policy and the provisions of services. This paper argues that this dismissal of experiential 
matters is based on an overinflated dichotomy – the fact/value dichotomy – and that, by valorising 
objectivist approaches to managing leisure resources, experiential matters have become nothing more 
than a policy-making faux pas. The paper argues that while experiential matters bring many 
challenges with respect to policy-making and the provision of leisure services, this type of experiential 
oversight is on of convenience rather than necessity  
 
Keywords: experiential perspective, false dichotomies, logical positivism, fact/value dichotomy, policy-
making.  
 
Introduction 
While the leisure studies tradition has invariably tended towards the softer side of the social 
inquiry impasse, one cannot help but acknowledge the increasing occurrence of the term 
experience to refer to the types and varieties of actions that we call leisure. While it might be 
crude to differentiate it as a unified or unifying narrative, the experiential perspective certainly 
demarcates some distinct ground from which the relationship between consumers, products and 
services, and symbolic meanings can be addressed (along with a variety of hedonic and aesthetic 
criteria that come with it). Most importantly, the experiential perspective tells us that if we are 
committed to studying leisure experiences then we regard them as being symbolically rich, 
inherently meaningful, and capable of communicating meaning. In fact, where other disciplines 
have discussed experiential consumption they have focused almost exclusively on leisure 
activities (cf. Arnould and Price, 1993 Celsi, Rose and Leigh, 1993 Hirschman and Holbrook, 
1982 Holbrook, 1995 Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982 Holbrook, Chestnut, Oliva and Greenleaf, 
1984). 
 If the experiential perspective offers all of this to our understanding of leisure action, then 
what does it offer to leisure practice? Well, one could be led to believe that it does not offer a 
great deal. Despite the fact that this perspective has had a profound impact on the way we view 
leisure behaviour, experiential matters have been renounced for being overtly subjective and for 
their inability to offer concrete criteria for leisure policy and the provisions of services. While it 
is acknowledged that the experiential view brings with it many challenges, the purpose of this 
paper is to argue that the dismissal of experiential matters is based on an overinflated dichotomy 
– a dichotomy that seems to be one of the lasting remnants of positivistic science. The paper 
argues that, although leisure is indeed (and continues to be) in transition, the silent hand of 
positivistic science permeates the leisure discipline at the political level. By separating fact and 
value, and by valorising objectivist approaches to managing leisure resources, experiential 
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matters have become nothing more than a policy-making faux pas. This, it must be added, has 
turned out to be an increasingly problematic position.  
The silent hand of positivistic policy-making 
Except in those cases where academics have attempted to situate the analysis of the concept of leisure 
itself in philosophical terms, the research has emerged relatively unscathed by philosophical 
analysis…Leisure research cannot be hermetically sealed off from philosophy but can, and sometimes 
does, proceed ignorant of it (McNamee and Brackenridge, 2006). 
Although what is meant by the silent hand of positivism defies simple classification, the quote 
outlined above certainly captures the spirit of it as it pertains to leisure. For example, Parry and 
Johnson (2007) noted that despite the increasing occurrence of qualitative approaches in the 
leisure sciences literature, much of this work has remained within the traditional scientific 
orientation. Phenomenological accounts, according to Goulding (2005: p. 294), seem to be “free 
from any guiding philosophy and [have even been] described in terms of content analysis 
and…statistics”. Similarly, Zealand (2007) noted that while there has been a general tendency in 
the leisure sciences literature to uncover the lived nature of leisure experiences, the preferred 
approach remains atavistically charged by the positivistic prototype of a priori categories and 
dimensions. That is, despite the fact that most leisure (or consumption) related publications point 
towards a repose that is increasingly post-positivistic, the transition (to some “post-ism” as 
Henderson put it) has been far from unified, not to mention nothing like complete. 
Although the methodological consequences of leisure in transition are significant enough, 
it is perhaps in Burton (1996) and Henderson (2000; 2006) that the silent hand of positivism has 
been most expressly articulated. That is, in their discussions of the ubiquity of false dichotomies. 
Following Wilson (1980), Burton (1996) argued that “Western thought is characterized by the 
use of dichotomies…[and] such dichotomies are central to rational positivistic science” (p. 19). 
He argued further that, although there is an increasing plurality of methodological 
representations of leisure behaviour, the “increased questioning of positivistic, quantitative 
science…has not led to a serious re-examination of the appropriate place of logic and reason in 
the social domain” (Burton 1996: p. 18). Rather, it has led (according to Burton) merely “to a 
series of squabbles about the appropriate relevance of non-quantitative, but thoroughly structured 
and ordered techniques of scientific investigation into social phenomena” (p. 18). The diffusion 
of positivistic influence has, of course, extended beyond the methodological domain.  
Henderson (2000) makes a similar argument. Whilst also contemplating leisure in 
transition, and the increasing intellectual diversity that comes with it, Henderson argued “I am 
not sure that we appreciate the value and the challenges that these multiple options hold” (p. 49). 
Henderson continued by saying “I believe…it is useful to place some of the false dichotomies on 
the table so that we can articulate the changes that are occurring in leisure research” (p. 49). 
Extending on these points a little, I am not sure that we appreciate how much the positivistic 
tradition has been imbricated in Western narratives – even outside of the methodological domain. 
Based on this premise, I would like to argue that it is as important (if not more so) to critically 
examine these false dichotomies so that we can identify where changes are not occurring so that 
we can effect change in leisure research and practice. If, as Burton (1996: p. 28) suggested, 
“[l]eisure studies has suffered…from the inappropriate use of dichotomies” then logical 
positivism’s separation of fact and value is by all accounts the most dangerous – and its danger is 
not lessened by the fact that it has been so widespread.  
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A case of thy blood or mine? 
EVERYTHING MUST GO – SCIENTIFIC VERIFIABILITY OR YOUR MONEY BACK…Be sure 
to leave all metaphysical matters at the door. 
If the logical positivists were experts at anything outside of reason and logic it is clear that, given 
the vehement expression of their theses throughout the scientific enterprise, it was huckster 
marketing.1 Logical positivism, according to Putnam (1995: p. 155), “was fundamentally a denial 
of entanglement, an insistence on sharp dichotomies: science-ethics, science-metaphysics, 
analytic-synthetic”. As McNamee (1994) described, because verification or falsification do not 
operate in the arena of evaluative judgments (of ethics or aesthetics say), value judgments were 
deemed to be logically weak. Moreover, not only were they deemed to express mere assertions 
and not logical arguments, the fact/value dichotomy was further premised on the notion that 
value terms could not (and did not) describe states of affairs in the world. So, for scientists at 
least, value judgments were cognitively meaningless.  
 An important notion put forward in Burton (1996) must be specified here, lest we 
underwrite the force of the positivistic movement outside of science. Burton writes, 
“[d]ifficulties occur not because dichotomies are developed as analytic tools for problem 
identification and investigation, but because researchers and policymakers so often treat them not 
as intellectual constructs but as naturally occurring phenomena” (p. 19). Putnam (2002) makes a 
similar point in his recent treatise on the collapse of the fact value dichotomy when he 
distinguishes between a mere distinction and a metaphysical dichotomy. Using John Dewey as 
his example, Putnam explains that, although Dewey’s philosophical project entailed the 
foundering of a great many dualisms, it is a great misunderstanding to infer that he was, at the 
same time, attacking all philosophical distinctions – according to Putnam, “[n]othing could be 
further from the truth” (p. 9). There is “fuzziness”, Putnam suggests, between what should be 
considered an ordinary distinction and a metaphysical dichotomy and, for the logical positivists 
at least, the nature of facts and values very much fell under the latter remit. The distinctions that 
can be found in Hume’s empiricism (matters of fact/relations of ideas and is/ought) became 
foundational metaphysical dichotomies for its twentieth century daughter logical positivism 
(analytic/synthetic and fact/value respectively) – with rather tremendous consequences it must be 
added.  
 Now, while matters of fact and value might seem like ivory-tower issues, both Putnam 
(1995; 2002) and Sen (1987) have brought to our attention that this dichotomy came to be 
regarded as undoubtedly correct by economists in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, 
the connection between the logical positivist claim that why people respond favourably to certain 
facts and unfavourably to others is a matter of sociological concern (à la Ayer) and the claim by 
leading economist (of his time) Lionel Robbins that “interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
meaningless” is not one of mere coincidence. And, as a matter of fact, positivistic economics is 
most expressly articulated in the latter. Robbins is most (in)famously renowned for emphasizing 
the arbitrary character of ethical discussion (they cannot emit a logical argument) and, as a 
corollary, the jettisoning of welfare economics (at the depths of the depression Putnam reminds 
us). The position, in Robbin’s terms can be stated as follows: 
If we disagree about ends it is a case of thy blood or mine – or live and let live according to the 
importance of the difference, or the relative strength of our opponents. But if we disagree about 
means, then scientific analysis can often help us resolve our differences. If we disagree about the 
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morality of the taking of interest (and we understand what we are talking about), then there is no room 
for argument (Robbins, 1952 [1935]: p. 150). 
The net effect of this position is that one could only talk about ethics and economics in 
juxtaposition because economics deals with ascertainable facts and ethics with obligation and 
evaluation. As Putnam (2002: p. 54) described, “[w]ith one stroke, the idea that the economist 
could and should be concerned with the welfare of society in an evaluative sense was rejected”. 
By taking their dualistic wares to the scientific marketplace, logical positivism contributed to the 
disenchantment of metaphysics and, as a corollary, the impoverishment of welfare economics. 
Through a policy-science whose recommendations impact the lives of billions of people through 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, it seems as though there is no aspect of 
human life that has gone unaffected by this dichotomy. Moreover, despite the fact that the sterile 
dichotomies of positivistic science have been looked upon as conflated and naïve by 
philosophers for many years, values remain very much a vexed question outside of philosophy. 
As the positivist qua marketer might have said, “Now if that’s not market penetration, I don’t 
know what is!” 
The snares of objectivism 
This kind of objectivism, derivative of logical positivism, has manifested itself in many forms 
within the leisure literature. However implicit this might be, it’s impact seems to have been (and 
might vey well continue to be) radically influential?? 
If, as Kuhn (1962) noted, the dominant paradigm explained why mature sciences progressed and 
others did not, then one immediately recognizes why the products of positivistic science became 
for many, so ineluctable. The objectivist position provided the crude, omnipotent position from 
which claims to scientific rigour could be built and this “view from nowhere” came to be 
regarded as the only sure basis for scientific legitimacy. Although it is certainly crude to equate 
logical positivism with objectivism ipso facto, the latter provides a useful label for covering all 
of those disparate areas that have (explicitly or implicitly) been affected by it. Moreover, since 
the notion of value judgements being subjective is so deeply imbricated in Western narratives, 
the use of this label seems quite logical for heuristic purposes. 
 While matters of fact and value seem remote from concerns of leisure provision, the spirit 
of the logical positivist position is aptly described in McNamee’s (1994) paper Valuing Leisure 
Practices. While his position is not be interpreted as objectivist,2 McNamee argued that “the 
subjectivist thesis is to be shunned by academics and other professionals concerned with leisure” 
(p. 291). The central reason for this, according to McNamee, is that “it offers no criteria (and 
hence no logical basis over mere preference) against which to evaluate such practices or make 
subsequent policy decisions” (p. 291-292). If we are concerned with what leisure practices are 
worth providing, “[t]he subjectivist thesis offers us no clues or direction” (p. 292). The 
objectivist position, however, appears equally fraught with difficulties. 
 The snares of objectivism are to be found (if only implicitly) in Coalter’s (1998) critique 
of the normative citizenship paradigm. As Coalter recounted, “it was accepted that public 
provision must provide equal opportunities for all…democratise areas of public 
leisure…reduc[e] constraints and encourag[e] participation” (p. 27). By the late 1980s, however, 
Coalter observed that leisure services came under attack for their failure to cater for those groups 
most in need. Because the provision of services were determined almost exclusively by “experts” 
(professionals, bureaucrats, the social elite, or “men of affairs” to borrow from Veblen, 2007 
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[1918]: p. 22), the objectivist orientation led to “crisis in the relationship between citizens and 
inflexible, bureaucratic and non-responsive public services” (Coalter, 1998: p. 28). In fact, while 
Coalter’s discussion is directed towards the areas of public leisure provision that deal with the 
management of public sports and recreation facilities, the management of tourist sites also 
provides examples germane to the problems with an objectivist position (heritage attractions in 
particular).  
Rojek’s (1988; 1995) discussion of citizenship rights relating to the management of 
access at Stonehenge provides a particularly revealing example. Since the state undertakes the 
management of these resources “for all”, Rojek highlighted how this can raise problems with 
social groupings who seek to occupy these public spaces in a manner conflicting with those 
specified by the state. By defining a minimal set of uses for the site (an objectivist orientation) 
the state stigmatized and obstructed groups who defined the use-value of the site on different 
terms.3 More recently, Garrod and Fyall (2000) have suggested that the key performance 
indicators utilised in the management of heritage attractions are anathema to the sustainability 
imperative. Site managers, according to Garrod and Fyall (2000: p. 698), “expect heritage 
attractions to adopt a largely reactive strategy towards the sustainability issue…[and] accept that 
more costly impacts are inevitable rather than…tak[ing] strategic measures to moderate them”. 
The more explicit claim in this instance is that recreational welfarism (and notions of “access for 
all” and “equal opportunities”) is at odds with the curatorial approach to site management.4 As 
this preservationist position celebrates the inherent or intrinsic value of artefacts and monuments, 
management see themselves more as guardians of the past rather than providers or facilitators of 
community leisure. So, although Poria and Ashworth (2009) have argued that heritage tourism 
can act as a mechanism for social stability, identity realization/creation, and solidarity etc. the 
curatorial approach to site management represents a significant barrier to this normative 
imperative. In fact, it is not unreasonable to think that this might be an ongoing tension without 
significant scope for resolve. 
While the heritage example represents only one area among many that could be 
considered contested leisure, it obviously raises some general questions as to the ownership of 
leisure spaces, the representation of minority groups’ needs, the low trust evaluation afforded to 
certain population sub-groupings, conflict, and social inclusion/exclusion. Despite the fact that 
the subjectivist thesis has been castigated for its inability to offer evaluative criteria for leisure 
policy, the key performance indicators typical of objectivist positions have also come under 
critical scrutiny – for their inability to develop welfare-related performance targets in particular 
(cf. Coalter, 1995; 1998). Taken together with the broader leisure sector, the snares of 
objectivism highlight various inherent tensions between ideological positions and the actual 
provision and delivery of products and services at the ground level (authenticity and 
sustainability in particular). 
Planning for leisure from an experiential perspective? 
It is quite paradoxical that, on the one hand, we have a view of leisure consumption that reflects 
a fundamental shift towards a more experientially oriented society yet, on the other, we have an 
attitude towards policy-making and the provision of services that occludes such criteria. And for 
reasons that should be clear at this point, planning for leisure from an experiential perspective is 
a rather contested issue – perhaps even an oxymoron. It is contested because, despite the 
increasing occurrence of the term experience to refer to the types and varieties of actions we call 
leisure, there still remains a rather noticeable tension between the provision of leisure services 
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and the consumption of leisure experiences. There have been various different reasons offered to 
explain this. 
 The relative absence of a concern with experiential matters, according to Coalter (1998: 
p.23), “is in part explained by a failure to develop a strong body of research in the psychology of 
leisure”. While this might have been significant enough in itself, Burton (1996) argues that it is 
due to an inappropriate fit between the outmoded and archaic ideological approach to leisure 
provision and the more fluid, protean, and fragmented needs of the market. Highly rational 
(objectivist) approaches to policy making, according to Burton, “do not meet the needs of [the] 
diverse and complex mix of people who make up the real world and for whom leisure services 
are provided”. He continued by saying that “[b]y oversimplifying and denying the complicated 
and often paradoxical characteristics and needs of difference social groups, these models 
perpetuate policies and delivery systems that are out of step with the complexities of social 
reality” (p. 26). According to Holbrook (1985; 1995), this tension results not merely because 
delivery systems are out of step, but rather, because of an indefatigable conflict of interest 
between both parties to the exchange – a position he seems to have inherited from Veblen. 
According to Veblen (2007 [1918]: p. 22), who was commenting on the academic ethic in 
America at the time, “the technologist and the professional man are, like other men of affairs, 
necessarily and habitually impatient of any scientific or scholarly work that does not obviously 
lend itself to some practical use”. The technologist, he continued, “appreciates what is 
mechanically serviceable; the professional man…appreciates what promises pecuniary gain; and 
the two unite with the business-man at large in repudiating whatever does not look directly to 
such a utilitarian outcome” (p. 22).  
Therefore, while the experiential consumer has to face the full consequences of their 
thoughts and feelings as they seek to grant space to emotions, the objectivist position seems to 
float several feet above the ground. And this impasse is perpetuated by the fact that objectivist 
approaches to policy-making and the provision of services continue to take what is essentially 
emotional and inherently meaningful and continue to approach it from a neo-classical angle. And 
just like the examples provided from the heritage sector, it is not unreasonable to think that this 
might be an ongoing tension without any significant scope for resolve. 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that experiential or subjectively informed analyses of culture have driven 
shifting views on the philosophy of science (by calling into question traditional categories of 
meaning), the leisure studies tradition has tended to overlook the fact that the sharp dichotomies 
of positivistic science still pervade our discipline at various levels (in addition to the 
methodological). The silent hand of positivism, as it has been articulated in this paper, is a direct 
result of this and, while this point has not been explicitly articulated in recent leisure research, it 
seems as though it has been at the core of various critical commentaries – if only implicitly (cf. 
Burton, 1996 McNamee, 1994 McNamee and Brackenridge, 1996 Watkins, 2000).  
While it would be remiss to suggest that we have not moved beyond the brand of 
Robbinsonian (positivistic) economics that was so influential in the 1930s, it is clear that the 
current economic climate is fertile ground for this type of objectivism. That is, while the net 
effect of Robbins’ position was incommensurability between ethics and economics, it seems as 
though the objectivist position to leisure provision allows us only talk about experiential matters 
and planning in juxtaposition. The objectivist position is problematic because it allows leisure 
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professionals and policy-makers of all kinds to relativise matters of experiential concern and, as 
a corollary, dismiss hard ethical questions with respect to the use, misuse, and abuse of leisure 
services. While it is acknowledged that experiential matters bring many challenges with respect 
to policy-making and the provision of leisure services, this type of experiential oversight (even in 
the current economic climate) is to be considered one of convenience rather than necessity.  
Notes 
1. In a dialogue with A.J. Ayer broadcast on the BBC, Magee (cf. Magee, 2001) likened the logical positivists to 
a political party. Speaking of Ayer’s most famous treatise, Language, Truth and Logic, he described how “[t]he 
aggressiveness of the book was typical of the movement as a whole…[t]hey self-consciously organized 
themselves like a political party, with regular meetings, publications and international congresses, propagating 
their doctrines with missionary zeal” (p. 95). Looking back, it would not be absurd to say that the diffusion of 
logical positivism throughout the philosophic enterprise (and beyond) was as much a product of “how it was 
being sold” as it was of “what was being sold”. 
2. McNamee (1994) offered R.S. Peters as an example of someone who has articulated an objectivist position and 
described how his own position “will resist such an asocial, ahistorical and timeless vantage point” (p. 290). 
3. Rojek makes two more important points about the dispute over access to the site at Stonehenge. Since the site 
became focus of civil disobedience, access to the site is limited by barriers. The application of secular, 
bureaucratic distinctions on site management, the state has contributed to the disenchantment of the monument. 
For minority groupings, the state provision has “violat[ed] the mystical integrity of the site…turning 
Stonehenge into just another tourist attraction” (Rojek, 1995: p. 73). Not apart from this is the state rebuttal 
that in order to manager the sustainability of such sites, these public spaces are maintained to serve the needs of 
“normal” visitors. As Rojek noted, this raises questions about the appropriate definition of “normality” and the 
place of discriminatory approaches to site management. The case at Stonehenge is a prime example of how 
leisure can be (and often is) a site for the reproduction of wider socio-cultural inequalities and not merely a 
vehicle of social or moral progress.   
4. According to Garrod and Fyall (2001) the curatorial approach designates those facets of property management 
that involve the preservation, maintenance, and (at times) the restoration of valued historic monuments and 
artefacts. According to Page and Mason (2004), it involves the celebration, care for, and interpretation of 
valued individual monuments. Professionalization of historic preservation and management, they described, 
naturally went hand-in-hand with the curatorial approach because “it presupposes a group of experts who know 
how to identity valued artefacts or monuments and how to care for them” (p. 141). Abutted to this is the notion 
that issues of financial solvency and public access, from this perspective, enter into the decision-making 
process only in a secondary manner. 
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